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    Federalism 
            Barry Cushman 
      
American constitutional federalism emerged from a complex matrix comprised by 
multiple intellectual, institutional, and experiential sources: from political theorists ranging from 
Machiavelli to Montesquieu and from Harrington to Hume; from colonial analogies to other 
dominions connected to the English realm through a common monarch, such as Ireland and 17th-
Century Scotland; and from an assortment of colonial customs, practices, and formal and 
informal institutional arrangements that were varied, fluctuating, contested, and in many respects 
underspecified.1 The multiplicity and diversity of these conceptual and historical inputs insured 
that the nature and implementation of the federal idea would be matters of continuing political 
and theoretical debate. 
Though the Supreme Court of the United States has played a preeminent role in the 
liquidation of the federal idea, its contours have been shaped by contributions from multiple 
centers: by state and federal legislators in decisions whether to initiate or enact legislation; by 
state and federal executives determining whether to approve or veto legislation with which they 
were presented; by state and federal judges reviewing legislation for constitutionality or 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (2010); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 
Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry (2007); Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 
1664-1830 (2005); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 
(2004); John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution (abridged ed., 1995); Jack P. Greene, 
Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (1994); Samuel H. Beer, To Make a 
Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (1993); Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional 
Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire (1985); John Phillip Reid, In a Defiant Stance: The 
Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American Revolution 
(1977); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (1975); Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers (1974); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969). 
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determining which rules of decision to apply in cases coming before them; by eloquent statesmen 
and commentators motivated by combinations of high principle and immediate interest; and by 
the people by whom such officials were elected to or retired from office. Much of the work of 
constructing a working federal system has been performed incrementally, as actors in each of the 
branches of government, and judges most particularly, have sought in the context of particular 
cases or issues to find solutions to the practical problems arising from the coexistence of two 
semi-autonomous levels of government within a single territory. Though the subjects addressed 
by this accumulative process have varied from generation to generation, many of the themes and 
tensions have proven remarkably durable. Still, the fallout from two exogenous shocks to the 
federal system have fundamentally reoriented the trajectory of American constitutional 
federalism. The first was the Civil War and the Reconstruction that followed; the second was the 
Great Depression and the resulting New Deal, which in the domain of political economy 
transformed American federalism from a regime constituted by a set of judicially-enforced rules 
into a system constituted by a collection of political values entrusted to the democratic process. 
In the domain of civil rights, meanwhile, the “rights revolution” saw the federal judiciary claim 
authority to decide questions previously left to state and local governments. 
This chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses salient developments in American 
constitutional federalism between the ratification of the Constitution and the Civil War. Part II 
examines the impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the federal equilibrium, particularly 
with respect to the domain of civil rights. Part III explores the intricate body of constitutional 
doctrine that the post-Civil War Court constructed to address the complex governance issues 
presented by a rapidly integrating and industrializing economy in a federal system, and the 
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disintegration of that body of doctrine during the crisis of the Great Depression. Part IV analyzes 
the evolution of American constitutional federalism in the post-New Deal era. 
 
The Antebellum Period 
The Constitution that emerged from the Philadelphia Convention created a federal 
government of limited and enumerated powers. The powers of Congress were listed in Article I, 
Section 8, and included authority to regulate commerce among the several states and with 
foreign nations, to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to establish lower federal courts. In 
addition, the Section’s final provision granted Congress power “To make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.” The Bill of Rights, 
ratified in 1791, imposed a series of affirmative limitations on federal power dealing principally 
with freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion; the right to keep and bear arms; takings or 
deprivations of private property; and matters concerning the investigation, prosecution, and 
adjudication of alleged criminal offenses. The Tenth Amendment provided that “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” Article I, Section 10 imposed limitations on the 
power of state governments to engage in foreign policy, tax foreign trade, regulate currency, and 
enact retrospective laws, and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI bound state judges to enforce 
the federal Constitution, valid federal statutes, and national treaties, even where they conflicted 
with a state constitution or state law. In other respects the Constitution left the states with broad 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. 
The Supreme Court’s assertion and establishment in the early years of the Republic of the 
power to review state and federal legislation for its compliance with the Constitution brought to 
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the Court a series of litigants claiming that either a state or the federal government had 
transgressed limitations imposed by the national charter. During the antebellum period, the 
justices settled a handful of important questions concerning the nature of the federal republic that 
ratification of the Constitution had created. Several of these had to do with the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,2 the justices upheld the constitutionality of Section 
25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 
over certain state court decisions involving the Constitution, treaties, or federal statutes. In 
Cohens v. Virginia,3 the Court extended this holding to cases in which one of the states was a 
party. These two decisions consolidated the vision of a national judicial system in which the state 
courts would serve in some respects as lower federal courts. 
Three significant restraints on federal judicial power emerged from different sources. The 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1795 overruled the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,4 which had provoked fierce objections from the states, and established that the federal 
courts did not have jurisdiction in cases in which a citizen of one state sued another state. In 
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,5 a narrowly divided Court declined to follow the path 
blazed by several lower court decisions in the 1790s, and declared that the lower federal courts 
had no jurisdiction to try cases charging criminal offenses at common law. Such courts could 
exercise jurisdiction only where the infraction alleged had been made criminal by congressional 
statute. And in connection with efforts by Georgia officials to force the Cherokee from the state 
to the western Indian Territory, the Court held in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia6 that Native 
                                                          
2 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
3 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
4 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
5 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
6 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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American nations were not foreign nations within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, 
but instead “domestic dependent nations” without standing to invoke the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.  
These curtailments of jurisdiction were, however, accompanied by three modes of 
expansion. First, in The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,7 the Court overruled the precedent of the 
Steamboat Thomas Jefferson,8 which had held that the federal admiralty jurisdiction extended 
only to the ebb and flow of the tide. Henceforth, that jurisdiction would extend to all navigable 
inland waterways as well. Second, in Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson9 and Marshall v. B&O 
Railroad Co.,10 the Court departed from earlier precedents and, through the use of a legal fiction, 
effectively held that corporations were citizens for purposes of suing and being sued in federal 
court under Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of different states 
(“diversity” jurisdiction). And third, decisions such as Swift v. Tyson11 held that federal courts 
sitting in diversity were not obliged by Section 34 of the Judiciary Act to apply the decisional 
law of the states in which they sat, but could instead apply what they determined to be the 
“general” common law governing the controversies before them. Over time, the domain of the 
general common law expounded by federal courts came to include the law of contracts, 
commercial transactions, torts, insurance, common carriers, and eventually even of real property. 
Though there were few questions concerning the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers 
that generated significant litigation before the Civil War, those that did produced some of the 
period’s most celebrated and vilified decisions. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton’s 
                                                          
7 53 U.S. 443 (1851). 
8 23 U.S. 428 (1825). 
9 43 U.S. 497 (1844). 
10 57 U.S. 314 (1853). 
11 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315612 
 6 
 
financial system was among the most divisive issues of the early Republic, and his proposal for a 
congressionally chartered Bank of the United States elicited considerable constitutional 
controversy. James Madison, arguing for a narrow construction of Congress’s enumerated 
powers, observed that the Constitution conferred no such power to charter a bank. Indeed, 
Madison’s own motion that the federal government be empowered to grant corporate charters 
had been rejected at the Philadelphia Convention. As for Article I’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Madison maintained, it should be read so as to authorize only such powers as arose by 
“unavoidable implication” from those specifically enumerated. Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson, asked by President Washington for his views on the constitutionality of the Bank Bill, 
replied that it was beyond congressional power. Construing the text strictly, Jefferson observed 
that the Constitution conferred no express power to charter a bank, and maintained that the term 
“necessary” should be read not to mean merely “convenient,” but instead should be rendered as 
“indispensable.” Hamilton, by contrast, insisted that the Constitution conferred both express and 
implied powers on Congress, and he gave the Necessary and Proper Clause its classic broad 
construction: “If the end be clearly contemplated within any of the specified powers, and it the 
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of 
the Constitution, it may be safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national 
authority.” 
Washington signed the bill, but the charter lapsed of its own terms in 1811. When then-
President Madison was faced with a bill to charter a Second Bank in 1816, his opinion on the 
constitutional issue had not changed. But because he believed that the actions of the political 
branches and the American people had settled the question in favor of the Bank’s 
constitutionality, he declined to veto the bill. When a unanimous Supreme Court placed its 
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constitutional imprimatur on the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland,12 Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause simply paraphrased the construction 
rendered by Hamilton nearly three decades earlier: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are 
Constitutional.”13 In 1832, however, Congress preemptively sent a bill renewing the Bank’s 
charter to a hostile President Andrew Jackson. Invoking departmental principles of constitutional 
interpretation, Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground that Congress lacked the constitutional 
power to enact it. Continued domination of the presidency by Democratic successors ensured 
that Jackson’s views of the Bank’s constitutionality would prevail throughout the antebellum 
period. 
In Gibbons v. Ogden,14 the Court offered its principal antebellum exposition of the 
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The case involved the validity of New 
York’s grant of a monopoly in steamboat navigation on the Hudson River between New York 
and New Jersey. Here Chief Justice Marshall established that “commerce among the several 
states” included not merely “traffic,” i.e., the buying and selling of goods, but all commercial 
“intercourse,” including interstate navigation. Associate Justice William Johnson maintained that 
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive, and that the grant of this 
power to Congress implicitly deprived the states of legislative jurisdiction over the subject. 
Marshall found it unnecessary to reach this question, finding that the New York legislation 
conflicted with a 1793 federal coastal licensing statute, and was therefore void under the 
                                                          
12 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
13 Id. at 421. 
14 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
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provision of Article VI declaring statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority 
“the Supreme Law of the Land.”   
Despite the Court’s seemingly broad formulation of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons, 
the antebellum Congress hesitated to call upon that power as a source of regulatory authority. 
Perhaps most notable in this regard was the failure of Congress seriously to consider regulation 
or prohibition of the interstate trade in slaves.15  Instead, the three decades following Gibbons 
witnessed the justices engaging in a divisive debate over whether and to what extent the 
“negative implications” of the Constitution’s grant of power over interstate commerce to 
Congress imposed restraints on the taxing and regulatory powers of the states. Though they 
disagreed over whether the commerce power was exclusive or concurrent, and the extent to 
which it qualified the states’ police powers to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of their 
inhabitants, the members of the Court on the whole upheld state measures challenged under what 
came to be known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause. Ultimately, in Cooley v. Pennsylvania 
Board of Wardens,16 six of the nine justices joined an opinion that split their differences. They 
agreed that some aspects of interstate commerce were national in character and therefore could 
be regulated only by Congress. With respect to the regulation of such activities, congressional 
power was exclusive. Other aspects, by contrast, were local in character. The states were 
permitted to regulate these aspects of interstate commerce unless and until Congress had 
legislated with respect to them. With respect to these activities, state power was concurrent, 
though federal power was paramount. The majority justices agreed that Pennsylvania’s 
challenged regulation of pilotage fell into the latter category, but the determination of which 
activities fell into which category was for the most part left open to the case-by-case 
                                                          
15 See Arthur Bestor, “The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis,” 69 Am. Hist. Rev. 327 (1964). 
16 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
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determination of future Courts. As one scholar has put it, the Cooley decision’s most “significant 
feature” was “not the formulation of a definitive doctrine but the court’s tacit agreement to stop 
looking for one.”17 
Federalism also played a central role in the law of freedom and slavery. In 1776, slavery 
was legal in all of the North American colonies. But the Constitution left the decision over 
whether to countenance slavery to the several states, and over the next three decades eight 
northern states took steps to emancipate their slave populations, either gradually or at a stroke. 
For the remainder of the antebellum period, new free and new slave states were admitted to the 
Union in nearly equal proportions, so that in 1858 Abraham Lincoln could with reason describe 
the nation as “half slave and half free.” The heterogeneity of state policy positions on the issue 
gave rise to a series of controversies over states’ rights and federal power. 
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provided that “The citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states.” This provision was 
understood to require that, with regard to the enjoyment of certain privileges and immunities, a 
citizen of one state traveling in a second state must be treated by that state as if he were one of its 
own citizens. The question of whether free blacks from northern states were citizens entitled to 
the equal enjoyment of such privileges and immunities when traveling to unfree states arose in 
two contexts.  
The first concerned the so-called Negro Seamen’s Laws, enacted by the legislatures of 
South Carolina and six other coastal slave states. Those statutes prescribed that black sailors be 
incarcerated in local jails for the periods during which their ships were in port. In 1823 Justice 
Johnson, sitting in his capacity as a federal circuit judge, heard a constitutional challenge to 
                                                          
17 R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court Under Marshall and Taney 107 (2d ed., 2006). 
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South Carolina’s statute. Anticipating his concurring opinion in Gibbons, Johnson held that the 
statute offended the dormant Commerce Clause.18 South Carolina and its sister states 
nevertheless persisted in enforcing their laws, and in 1832, President Andrew Jackson’s Attorney 
General, Roger Taney, wrote an opinion concluding that the southern statutes did not violate 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Anticipating his own decision a quarter century 
later in Dred Scott v. Sandford,19 Taney wrote that “[t]he African race in the United States, even 
when free, are everywhere a degraded class, and exercise no political influence. The privileges 
they are allowed to enjoy, are accorded to them as a matter of kindness and benevolence rather 
than of right….They were not looked upon as citizens by the contracting parties who formed the 
Constitution….and were not intended to be embraced in any of the provisions of that 
Constitution but those which point to them in terms not to be mistaken.”20 
The second context in which the Privileges and Immunities issue arose concerned the so-
called exclusion laws. Most southern states enacted legislation prohibiting free blacks from 
entering their states, and by 1857, four northern states had joined their ranks. No successful 
constitutional challenge to these measures ever was mounted, and an 1856 decision of the 
Indiana Supreme Court enforcing that state’s statute appeared to assume its constitutionality.21 
Article IV, Section 2 also provided that “No Person held to Service or Labor in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the 
                                                          
18 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (C.C.D. S.C., 1823). 
19 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
20 Opinion and supplement accompanying letters of Taney to Secretary of State Edward Livingston, dated May 28 
and June 9, 1832, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State Papers, National Archives, quoted in Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 70 (1978). In Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839), then-Chief Justice Taney would similarly hold that corporations were not citizens for 
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
21 Barkshire v. State, 7 Ind. 389 (1856). 
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Party to whom such Service or Labor may be due.” This Fugitive Slave Clause did not specify 
the means by which its directives were to be enforced, but in 1793 Congress assumed powers of 
enforcement by enacting the first Fugitive Slave Act. The Act permitted the owner of a fugitive 
slave or the owner’s agent to seize the alleged slave and to bring him before either a federal or 
state judge in the free state in which the alleged slave was located. If the owner or agent could 
prove title to the fugitive by affidavit or oral testimony, the judge was to issue the captor a 
certificate of removal permitting the captor to leave the jurisdiction with the fugitive. In addition, 
the Act imposed criminal penalties for obstructing the capture and for rescuing, harboring, 
aiding, or hiding an alleged fugitive slave. 
  Northern antislavery lawyers and legislators, construing the Constitution strictly, 
maintained that, because the Constitution was silent on the mechanism for rendition of fugitives, 
the matter had been left to the several states. Anxious to protect their free black citizens from 
wrongful abduction, they persuaded legislators in most northern states to enact anti-kidnapping 
statutes providing procedural protections for alleged fugitive slaves in proceedings before state 
judges. In the 1842 case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,22 the Supreme Court struck down 
Pennsylvania’s anti-kidnapping statute on the ground that it conflicted with the 1793 Fugitive 
Slave Act and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. At the same time, however, the 
Court maintained that the federal government could not compel state governments to enforce the 
federal Act. Such a requirement would be an infringement on states’ rights. Justice Story’s 
majority opinion further acknowledged that the states could refuse to allow their officers and 
officials to enforce the federal law. In response, northern states withdrew the assistance of their 
law enforcement officials in helping slave owners recapture fugitive slaves. Several state 
                                                          
22 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
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legislatures enacted personal liberty laws, prohibiting state officials from enforcing the federal 
Act, or repealed statutes that had directed state officials to enforce it. And numerous state court 
judges cited Prigg in holding that they were without power to issue a certificate of removal or 
otherwise entertain proceedings concerning fugitive slaves. Slave owners could proceed to the 
federal courts, but they were few and far between, and might be more than a hundred miles away 
and not even in session. The protections that the personal liberty laws provided for free blacks 
and fugitive slaves prompted John C. Calhoun to denounce them as “one of the most fatal blows 
ever received by the South and the Union.” They had, he lamented, rendered the constitutional 
obligation to return runaways “of non-effect, and with so much success that it may be regarded 
now as practically expunged from the Constitution.”23 
 In 1850, in response to southern demands for a more stringent federal law prompted by 
the passage of the new northern personal liberty laws, Congress enacted a statute beefing up the 
enforcement provisions of the 1793 Act with the creation of federal fugitive slave 
commissioners, who were granted authority to issue certificates authorizing the removal of a 
captured fugitive from a free state. Several northern states responded by enacting new personal 
liberty laws designed to frustrate the federal rendition process by denying slave catchers the 
assistance of state officials or the use of state jails, appointing commissioners to defend anyone 
claimed as a fugitive, strictly punishing anyone guilty of seizing a free man, and supplying 
alleged fugitives with substantial procedural guarantees. In some states, such as Massachusetts, 
slave catchers were so intimidated by the obstacles to rendition that they simply stopped 
pursuing those who managed to reach free soil. Southern politicians complained that these 
personal liberty laws had rendered the federal statute a dead letter, and South Carolina’s 
                                                          
23 6 Richard Cralle, ed., The Works of John C. Calhoun 292 (1870), quoted in Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The 
Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861 130 (1974). 
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Declaration of the Causes of Secession of 1860 listed the personal liberty laws as the first of its 
grievances against the northern states. The Declaration charged that “fourteen of the States have 
deliberately refused, for years past, to fulfill their constitutional obligations” by enacting “laws 
which either nullify” the Fugitive Slave Laws of Congress “or render useless any attempt to 
execute” those laws.24 
Occasionally a slave owner traveling to or through a free state would voluntarily bring 
with him one or more of his slaves. Before the mid-1830s, free states generally extended comity 
to the law of southern states by allowing masters to sojourn in the North accompanied by their 
slaves. If, however, the master established a domicile in the northern state, then the slaves 
accompanying him became free. The question of domicile usually turned on the intentions of the 
master, but states such as Pennsylvania and New York enacted statutes providing that the master 
became a domiciliary of their states if he remained there for longer than six or nine months, 
respectively. Similarly, if the master returned to his southern home after having established a 
domicile in a free state, southern state courts extended comity to northern state laws by holding 
that slaves that had accompanied the master were as a result now free.25 
 Beginning in the 1836, however, under the spur of rising abolitionist sentiment and 
Joseph Story’s 1834 treatise on the Conflict of Laws, northern state courts began to grant 
freedom to slaves that had been brought into their jurisdictions for much shorter periods of time.  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts led the way with its 1836 decision in 
Commonwealth v. Aves,26 but over the next two decades every northern state other than Indiana 
and New Jersey followed suit. Pennsylvania and New York repealed their comity statutes, with 
                                                          
24 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal 
Union (1860). 
25 Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union:  Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (1981). 
26 35 Mass. 193 (1836). 
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the effect that slaves traveling through those states could now be freed as soon as they crossed 
the border.27 In 1860, the New York Court of Appeals would hold that Virginia slaves who had 
spent a mere three days in a New York hotel awaiting passage on a ship were free.28 Slaves who 
escaped to free states remained enslaved under federal law, but slaves who were brought to a free 
state by their masters became free by virtue of state law. 
 Southern state courts responded by ceasing to extend comity to the northern law of 
freedom. Even if a northern court would have ruled that a slave had become free under the terms 
of the law of the jurisdiction into which his master had taken him, if the slave did not secure his 
freedom in the North but instead returned with his master to the South, southern courts began to 
rule that his status as a slave had “reattached” upon his return.29 The most famous such instance 
involved the slave Dred Scott, whose master, an army physician, had taken Scott with him for 
two-year postings in both the free state of Illinois and the free Minnesota Territory. Scott sued 
for his freedom when he returned, and the Missouri Supreme Court, refusing to extend comity to 
the laws of Illinois and the federal territory, held that Scott remained a slave.30 After Dr. 
Emerson died, Scott sought his freedom in federal court by suing the estate’s executor, Sanford. 
The defendant was a citizen of New York, and thus might have been amenable to suit under the 
federal court’s jurisdiction involving citizens of different states.31 But Chief Justice Taney 
reprised his interpretation of Article IV while Attorney General, holding that the federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because, as an African-American, Scott could not be a citizen 
for purposes of Article III even if he were free. Taney and his colleagues went on to hold that 
                                                          
27 Finkelman, An Imperfect Union. 
28 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
29 Finkelman, An Imperfect Union. 
30 Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). 
31 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case. 
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Scott was not free in any event, because the provision of the Missouri Compromise (1820) 
making the federal territory free was beyond congressional power to enact, and the slave state of 
Missouri was not required to extend comity to the law of the free state of Illinois.32 
The period’s central unresolved question in constitutional federalism, which became ever 
more pressing as time wore on, concerned the character of the Union. Was it a single, compound 
republic, partly national and partly federal, or was it instead merely a compact among sovereign 
States? Was the Union perpetual, or were States at liberty to withdraw from it? Though in 
connection with these inquiries intelligent contemporaries and subsequent commentators have 
lavished a great deal of attention on the question of whether the Nation preceded the States in 
time or vice versa, it does not appear that anything of consequence turns on the resolution of this 
issue. If in fact the States preceded the Nation in time, it does not follow that the States were at 
liberty to secede from the Union formed by the Constitution. Similarly, if the Nation preceded 
the States, it does not follow that the States were precluded by the Constitution from departing 
the Union. The relevant question was, what sort of union did the ratification of the Constitution 
call into being? The Constitution’s silence on that question assured that it would remain a 
disputed one. 
The issue was first prominently joined when the Federalist Congress enacted the Alien & 
Sedition Acts in 1798. In anonymous pamphlets authored respectively by James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions maintained that Congress was without 
power to enact the legislation in question. Madison’s Virginia Resolutions maintained that the 
sovereign states were empowered to judge independently the constitutionality of congressional 
legislation, and had the right and duty to “interpose” in order to preserve their rightful authority 
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and to protect the rights and liberties of their people “in case of a deliberate, palpable, and 
dangerous exercise” of powers not granted by the federal “compact.” Jefferson’s Kentucky 
Resolutions went further, claiming in addition that the proper remedy for federal overreaching 
was state “nullification” of such unconstitutional federal enactments. Though each of the 
documents called upon other states to cooperate in efforts to resist usurpation by the federal 
government, no sister states rallied to the cause. The issue soon was mooted by the expiration of 
the objectionable legislation, which lapsed before Jefferson’s inauguration as president in March 
of 1801. 
The issue again came to a head in 1832, however, when a South Carolina convention 
disgruntled by the allegedly unconstitutional 1828 federal “Tariff of Abominations” drew upon 
the compact theory of the Union articulated in Vice-President John C. Calhoun’s anonymously-
authored 1828 South Carolina Exposition and his 1831 Fort Hill Address in adopting an 
ordinance purporting to “nullify” the tariff within South Carolina. The ordinance declared 
unlawful any efforts by state or federal authorities to enforce the tariff, and directed the 
legislature to enact measures to prevent such enforcement. Moreover, the authors of the 
ordinance took a position that Madison and Jefferson had not advocated, and that Madison later 
disavowed, by threatening secession from the Union should the federal government attempt to 
coerce South Carolina in the matter. Like the authors of the South Carolina ordinance, most of 
the statesmen who had spoken on the issue to this point in the Nation’s history appeared not to 
regard the Union as necessarily perpetual. President Andrew Jackson, however, responded with a 
message denouncing both nullification and secession as unconstitutional, and Congress 
supported his position with the Force Act of 1833. The conflict ultimately was settled peacefully 
through negotiated compromise, but even in its measure repealing the ordinance, the South 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315612 
 17 
 
Carolina convention pointedly preserved its constitutional claims by expressly purporting to 
nullify the Force Act. As John Quincy Adams wrote of the issue of whether the Union was 
perpetual, “It is the odious nature of the question that it can be settled only at the cannon’s 
mouth.”33 
 
Civil War and Reconstruction 
And so it was. When South Carolina and ten other States enacted ordinances seceding 
from the Union in 1860 and 1861, President Abraham Lincoln denounced the actions as 
unconstitutional and mobilized the remaining States for a war to preserve the Union. 
Secessionists maintained that the federal government was the creature and agent of the people of 
the states, who remained the ultimate locus of sovereignty and had retained the power to 
withdraw from the Union. Lincoln and others insisted that sovereign authority rested with the 
people of the United States rather than those of the states severally, and that the perpetuity of the 
Union they had together created was implicit in its fundamental law. After the Union Army 
emerged victorious at Appomattox, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase of the Supreme Court of the 
United States articulated in memorable prose what many believed had been won on the 
battlefield. In pronouncing the Texas ordinance of secession a legal nullity, Chase declared in 
Texas v. White34 that, “[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union 
composed of indestructible States.” Notwithstanding some contrary theories seeking to explain 
and justify the fact that the delegations of several southern states had yet to be seated in 
Congress, and that large swaths of the South remained under extensive federal supervision, 
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Chase insisted that the Confederate States never had been outside the Union. “When, therefore, 
Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation… The act which 
consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the 
incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between 
Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union 
between the original States.” At the same, time, Chase cautioned, “the perpetuity and 
indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or 
of the right of self-government, by the States.” Under the Constitution, “all powers not delegated 
to the United States nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”35 With the question of the Union’s essential character definitively resolved, the Court 
would now devote its efforts to defining and policing the boundaries between state and federal 
legislative jurisdiction in a federal system transformed by three constitutional amendments and a 
series of landmark statutes. 
A particularly pressing question concerned the extent to which the constitutional 
amendments ratified in the wake of the Civil War had transformed the federal equilibrium. The 
Reconstruction Amendments were the first to withdraw power from the states and to grant 
additional power to Congress. The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) abolished slavery and 
involuntary servitude throughout the nation. The Fourteenth Amendment (1868), overruling 
Dred Scott, declared that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to their 
jurisdiction, were citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they resided. That 
Amendment also prohibited the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens, 
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from 
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denying to any the person equal protection of the laws. The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) further 
prohibited both the state and federal governments from denying the right to vote based on race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude. Moreover, each of the three Reconstruction 
Amendments granted Congress authority to enforce their provisions by appropriate legislation. In 
the ensuing two decades, the Court would repeatedly confront the question of whether legislation 
enacted pursuant to these new grants of authority lay within the power of Congress.  
In a number of cases the justices held that Reconstruction legislation exceeded 
congressional authority. In United States v. Reese,36 for example, the Court held that two 
provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870 that sought to protect voting rights exceeded the 
power conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment because they did not confine their protections to 
racially discriminatory conduct. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank,37 the Court 
invalidated indictments of defendants charged with the massacre of dozens of African-American 
voters on the ground that those indictments did not allege that the conduct was motivated by 
racial animus. In United States v. Harris,38 the Court unanimously invalidated a section of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871 that made conspiracies to deprive any person of the equal protection of 
the laws a federal crime. Twenty members of a lynch mob had been convicted under that section 
for abducting four prisoners from the custody of a Tennessee deputy sheriff and savagely beating 
them, one to death. The statute could not be sustained as an enforcement of the guarantees of the 
Thirteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, the Court held, because those Amendments secured 
protection only against actions taken because of the victim’s race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. (In fact, though in all likelihood unbeknownst to the justices, each of the victims in the 
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case was white). Nor could the Fourteenth Amendment supply a foundation for the challenged 
provision, as Section One of that Amendment secured a guarantee of equal protection against 
state action, and no such action had been alleged in this case. That same year, in the Civil Rights 
Cases,39 the justices likewise invalidated the public accommodations provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 on the ground the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to reach 
only racial discrimination perpetrated by state officials, and not by private individuals. 
Many scholars have viewed these decisions as comprising a judicially-led “retreat” from 
Reconstruction. On this account, the justices construed the power conferred upon Congress by 
the Reconstruction Amendments with an unduly narrow vision, thereby aiding the war-fatigued 
political branches in their program of forging sectional reconciliation on the backs and with the 
blood of the freedmen. Others have argued that this perspective credits the members of the 
Reconstruction Congresses with greater racial egalitarianism and a more robust desire to 
transform the federal system than they deserve. On this account, the Court’s decisions were 
instead coherent and principled applications of the more moderate aspirations of those who 
framed and ratified the Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, some scholars maintain that several 
of the Court’s decisions clearly left open constitutional pathways for Congress and federal 
prosecutors to reach racial discrimination, intimidation, and violence, in many cases even where 
perpetrated by private individuals. On this view, the federal officials to blame for the outrages of 
the Jim Crow South were not the justices of the Supreme Court, but instead those in the political 
branches who lost the will to deliver on the promise of the Reconstruction Amendments.40 
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This latter interpretation finds some support when these Reconstruction decisions are 
read against the broader backdrop of the Court’s congruent contemporary federalism 
jurisprudence. First, the justices recognized that the possession by the states of “all of the powers 
essential to separate and independent existence” placed inherent limitations of the powers of the 
federal government. In Lane County v. Oregon,41 for example, the Court held the state of Oregon 
was not required to take federal greenbacks from its counties in payment of their state tax 
obligations. Notwithstanding federal legislation making the paper currency legal tender for all 
debts public and private, Congress could not prescribe to the state the currency in which its 
power to tax might be satisfied. Similarly, in Collector v. Day,42 which along with McCulloch v. 
Maryland launched what would become a vast and complex body of case law identifying limits 
on the power of the state and federal governments to tax one another’s officials and 
instrumentalities, the Court held that the salary of a state judge could not be subjected to federal 
income tax. As Chief Justice Marshall had put it in McCulloch v. Maryland when striking down 
the state’s taxation of the Bank of the United States, the power to tax involved “the power to 
destroy.”43 Were one government permitted to tax the officials or instrumentalities of the other, it 
might make the tax so burdensome as to be insupportable, and thus destructive of the powers 
necessary to its separate and independent existence. From this it followed, as McCulloch had 
made clear, that the existence of the federal government placed inherent limitations on state 
power as well. So, for example, in Tarble’s Case,44 the justices ruled as they had in Abelman v. 
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Booth45 that federal officials having custody of federal prisoners were not amenable to writs of 
habeas corpus issued by state courts.46 
Such manifestations of what came to be called “dual federalism” were thus apparent both 
in cases that involved racial issues and in those that did not. The Court’s post-bellum 
preoccupation with policing the respective boundaries of state and federal authority was 
animated by the conviction that the federal and state governments occupied separate spheres of 
authority within which they were entitled to exercise all of the powers that they had been granted 
or retained, and that neither was permitted to trespass upon nor impede the exercise of the 
sovereign prerogatives of the other. Thus, the very existence of the state and federal governments 
implicitly limited the powers of each.47 
At the same, time, however, the Court also recognized that very existence of the federal 
government entailed the possession by Congress of certain inherent powers beyond those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. In Kohl v. United States,48 for instance, 
notwithstanding language in the constitutional text suggesting that Congress could acquire land 
within a state only by purchasing it with the consent of the state’s legislature, the Court held that 
the federal government had an inherent eminent domain power that could not be obstructed by 
intransigent persons or states. It was upon such notions of inherent federal power that the Court 
relied in upholding a conviction under the Enforcement Act in Ex parte Yarbrough.49 The case 
concerned the same section of the Act that had been unsuccessfully deployed in Cruikshank eight 
years earlier. But whereas Cruikshank had involved horrific violence in connection with a state 
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election, the black voter beaten by Yarbrough had been intercepted on his way to vote in a 
federal election.50 
Critics of the judicial “retreat from Reconstruction” hypothesis point to Yarbrough and 
other lesser-known decisions as evidence indicating that, even if the justices could be justifiably 
faulted for a callous focus on structural concerns in the face of pressing needs to safeguard 
Southern blacks’ rights to personal security, liberty, and equal protection, they were by no means 
implacably opposed to federal intervention to secure these rights. First, Reese, Cruikshank, and 
Harris indicated that statutes and indictments that were more narrowly tailored to target only 
racial discrimination with respect to rights secured by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
would pass constitutional muster. Moreover, such critics contend, both Cruikshank and Harris 
appeared rather casually to read the state action requirement out of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
leaving open the possibility of federal enforcement legislation criminalizing private efforts to 
deny the right to vote on the basis of race. In addition, some opinions have been read to suggest 
that the failure of state officials to protect their African-American citizens from private violence 
– a sort of state inaction – might constitute state action denying those citizens the equal 
protection of the laws, and that this in turn could authorize Congress to enact legislation 
punishing perpetrators pursuant to the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment. On this 
account, those potentialities lay unrealized because a Congress in which representatives of all of 
the former states of the Confederacy had now been seated refused to take up the Court’s 
invitations.51 
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Prior to its withdrawal from the field, however, Congress did enact a series of statutes 
enlarging the jurisdiction of the federal courts, thereby offering mistreated people who 
previously could seek redress only from state courts new opportunities to vindicate their rights 
before a more sympathetic federal tribunal. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted in 
response to the infamously discriminatory Southern “black codes,” guaranteed to the freedmen 
equal legal treatment with respect to rights of contract, property, and access to courts, as well as 
“the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” 
The Act further provided that anyone sued or arrested under a discriminatory law impinging 
upon the rights enumerated in that statute could remove his case to federal court. Second, before 
the Civil War, persons seeking habeas corpus from state custody could resort only to state courts. 
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, by contrast, authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas 
corpus “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the 
constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States.” Third, the Judiciary Act of 1875 granted 
the lower federal courts jurisdiction over all cases involving questions of federal law, and made 
all such cases initiated in state courts removable to a federal forum. Though the Supreme Court 
had enjoyed appellate jurisdiction over such cases since 1789, state courts had held monopolies 
over the trial and initial levels of appeal in all such “federal question” cases excepting those 
arising in specific areas, such as intellectual property, over which Congress had expressly 
conferred jurisdiction on the lower federal courts. 
Throughout the period between the “end” of Reconstruction in 1877 and the late New 
Deal, the Court generally upheld efforts to employ the Reconstruction Amendments to protect 
what were at the time considered the “civil” rights – those of contract, property, and vocational 
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liberty -- of the freedmen. In the 1867 federal circuit court case of In re Turner,52 for example, 
Chief Justice Chase struck down a racially discriminatory Maryland apprenticeship law. In Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins,53 the Court unanimously invalidated a conviction for violating a building code 
regulation that was discriminatorily administered against Chinese laundry owners with “an evil 
eye and an unequal hand” by local authorities. In Bailey v. Alabama54 and United States v. 
Reynolds,55 the Court invalidated southern labor regulations that ensnared impecunious African-
Americans in webs of debt peonage and forced servitude. And in Buchanan v. Warley,56 the 
Court unanimously struck down a residential housing ordinance that prohibited whites and 
blacks from buying homes from one another.  
These interventions did little to change realities on the ground, however. Southern 
authorities either openly defied or found ways to circumvent the Court’s rulings, and African-
Americans faced the prospect of economic coercion or private violence were they to pursue legal 
redress. Moreover, unlike the California Chinese, whose financial backing from Cantonese 
merchants enabled them to mount successful challenges to numerous discriminatory business 
and employment regulations in the federal courts, Southern blacks generally lacked access to the 
legal services necessary to enforce their rights. Notwithstanding these important judicial 
vindications of federal authority, the domain of “civil” rights remained governed almost 
exclusively by state law and local custom.57 
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The justices also often vindicated the “political” rights of the freedmen. In a pair of cases 
decided in 1880, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights of African-
Americans to sit on juries and the rights of black defendants to juries from which African-
Americans were not categorically excluded, and conferred upon Congress the power to protect 
those rights through positive legislation.58 In Guinn v. United States,59 the Court unanimously 
struck down an Oklahoma statute that the required passage of a literacy test for all prospective 
voters whose ancestors had not been eligible to vote before 1866. And in Nixon v. Herndon60 and 
Nixon v. Condon,61 the justices invalidated Texas statutes commanding or authorizing exclusion 
of African-American voters from Democratic primary elections.  
Here again, however, state resistance and black subordination were obstacles to realizing 
the promise of such decisions. The practice of striking African-Americans from jury venires 
through peremptory and for-cause challenges continued unimpeded. Oklahoma authorities 
cynically circumvented the Guinn decision in a manner that persisted for nearly a quarter-century 
until a case successfully challenging the scheme finally reached the Court in 1939.62 The Texas 
legislature maintained its white primary by withdrawing from its regulation and simply leaving 
the “private” Democratic Party to do as it liked. With state action no longer involved, the Court 
unanimously rejected a constitutional challenge to the Party’s rules excluding black primary 
voters in Grovey v. Townsend.63 Meanwhile, poll taxes, private intimidation, and discriminatorily 
administered literacy tests functioned to exclude vast numbers of Southern blacks from the 
franchise and, as a consequence, from eligibility to serve as jurors. The general spirit of judicial 
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resignation was captured by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion in Giles v. Harris,64 where 
he confessed that, without the aid of the political branches, the Court had little power to correct 
systemic voting discrimination in the South. Here again, the Reconstruction Amendments and 
enforcing legislation notwithstanding, the applicable “law in action” was state and local. 
In the domain of “social equality,” by contrast, southern authorities and Supreme Court 
justices were in agreement on the law. Just as the Court had held in the Civil Rights Cases that 
Congress was without power to prohibit private discrimination in hotels, restaurants, theaters, 
and the like, so the justices of this period upheld state and local regulations prescribing racial 
segregation in public schools (Cumming v. Richmond Board of Education,65 Gong Lum v. Rice66) 
and public transportation (Plessy v. Ferguson67), as well statutes prohibiting interracial marriage 
or cohabitation (Pace v. Alabama68). Regulation of such matters was left both legally and 
functionally to state and local authorities. 
 
From the Gilded Age Through the New Deal 
Along with such questions of minority rights, a central concern of the Court’s post-
bellum federalism jurisprudence was the scope of state and federal power to regulate business.  If 
scholars sometimes have described the resulting body of case law as incoherent, it may be 
because they have not fully appreciated two key features of “dual federalism.”  The first feature 
concerns the interconnected nature of the Court’s “dormant” and “affirmative” Commerce 
Clause decisions.  Although the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause cases were facially 
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concerned with defining the scope of state regulatory authority over commercial subjects left 
unregulated by Congress, we shall see that the categories developed in these decisions also 
would play an important role in defining the extent of Congress’s affirmative commerce power.  
Similarly, New Deal transformations in affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine would entail a 
reorientation of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The second neglected feature of post-
bellum federalism jurisprudence concerns the relationship between the Commerce Clause and 
due process.  As we shall see, the law of vested rights and due process played a critical role in 
defining the boundary between state and federal regulatory authority.  The New Deal-era 
collapse of dual federalism can thus be seen as resulting, at least in part, from the Court’s prior 
abandonment of traditional due process limitations.  After a review of the New Deal Court’s 
transformative Commerce Clause decisions and of coordinate developments concerning the 
congressional powers to tax and spend, this section concludes with a brief examination of some 
significant constitutional amendments and a discussion of contemporaneous developments 
concerning the treaty power, state sovereign immunity, rules governing diversity jurisdiction, 
and in the law of intergovernmental tax immunities. 
 The Court’s dormant Commerce Clause docket expanded considerably in the 
period following the Civil War, as an increasing number of enterprises carrying on an interstate 
business sought to dismantle time-honored schemes of state and local economic protectionism. 
In case after case, the justices found that longstanding programs of licensure, taxation, and 
inspection of out-of-state goods and salesmen failed to pass muster.69 Though the field of 
concurrent power recognized by Cooley persisted, it came to represent an increasingly small slice 
of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Instead, justices and commentators characteristically 
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referred to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce as “exclusive,” thereby placing the 
subject matter beyond the legislative jurisdiction of the states. The doctrine was animated by a 
frankly instrumental impulse to break down state and local barriers to interstate commercial 
traffic in an increasingly vibrant and integrated economy, and it functioned to open up a zone of 
free trade among the states.70 
At the same time, however, it was recognized that the theory of exclusive congressional 
jurisdiction, unless properly qualified, might be destructive of necessary state and local powers 
to tax and regulate. If every activity, tax, or regulation that had an effect on interstate commerce 
lay beyond the powers of state and local government, then the states and localities would be 
deprived of significant portions of their tax bases, and Congress alone would have the power to 
regulate such matters. Were Congress not to act, such activities would necessarily remain 
entirely free of regulation. The justices rightly doubted that Congress was prepared to take on 
such a herculean task, and in light of the great variation in local conditions and circumstances, 
they doubted as well that Congress could perform the task effectively even were it to try.71 
The Court therefore formulated the doctrine so as to leave room for a broad range of state 
and local taxation and regulation. To be sure, where a state or local regulation touched on a 
“national” matter or burdened interstate commerce “directly,” it would be held invalid. But as to 
“local” matters, any otherwise valid exercise of the police or taxing powers that affected 
interstate commerce only “incidentally,” “indirectly,” or “remotely” would be sustained. With 
such analytic distinctions at the ready, the justices upheld a broad range of nondiscriminatory 
programs of licensure, taxation, and regulation at the state and local level. Moreover, goods that 
had not yet begun their interstate transit, or had concluded their interstate journey and had come 
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to rest in the destination state, remained subject to state and local legislative jurisdiction. The 
overall effect of the doctrine was to remove impediments to free trade without simultaneously 
opening an enormous regulatory vacuum.72 
The paradigmatically “local” activities the regulation of which the doctrine left to state 
and local authorities were those of “production” – agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Thus, 
for example, state taxation or regulation of coal mining, iron mining, petroleum production, and 
the production of electricity each survived dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Regulations 
restricting the conditions under which cotton-seed oil companies could own or operate cotton 
gins, and prohibiting the manufacture of such controversial products as liquor and oleomargarine 
colored to resemble butter were likewise upheld. Production, even if intended for interstate sale, 
preceded interstate commerce, the Court held, and its regulation affected such commerce only 
“indirectly.” Were it otherwise, Congress would be saddled with the impossible task of enacting 
a vast array of “only locally applicable and utterly inconsistent” statutes regulating every act of 
human industry that contemplated an interstate market, while at the same time leaving to local 
regulators those acts that did not. This would “paralyze” state governments and create 
interminable tensions and confusions between federal and local authorities.73 
These dormant Commerce Clause decisions created the categories and set the terms 
within which the Court developed its jurisprudence concerning the scope of congressional power 
to regulate commerce among the several states. The justices regularly relied upon dormant 
Commerce Clause precedents in holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act could not reach acts of 
corporate consolidation in the manufacturing sector (e.g., U.S. v. E.C. Knight74) or labor strikes 
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or boycotts of manufacturing enterprises (e.g., United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel 
Trunk Co.75). The effect of such actions on interstate commerce was only “indirect.” During the 
New Deal the Court similarly reasoned to the conclusions that Congress could not regulate 
employment terms and relations between coal companies and their employees (Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co.76), nor those of a Brooklyn Kosher butchery that sold all of its meat locally (Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. U.S.77). The Justice Department enjoyed considerable success in prosecuting 
anticompetitive behavior both in the interstate railroad industry and among independent 
enterprises that entered into agreements not to compete with one another in interstate markets. 
The Court also recognized federal jurisdiction over mergers, acquisitions, and labor disturbances 
that were demonstrably undertaken with the intent to restrain interstate trade. There the effects 
on interstate commerce were “direct.” But in the absence of such evidence, the justices insisted 
that the regulation of activities of production was a matter reserved to the states.78 
During this period, then, much of affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence was the 
mirror image of its dormant counterpart. Matters subject to the legislative jurisdiction of one 
sovereign lay beyond that of the other. But just as the Cooley doctrine permitted states and 
localities to regulate provisionally some matters that were subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, 
two affirmative Commerce Clause doctrines recognized the power of Congress to regulate 
activities that would otherwise have been considered “local.” They were the “stream of 
commerce” doctrine, first announced in Swift v. U.S.,79 and the “Shreveport doctrine,” 
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inaugurated in the so-called Shreveport Rate Case.80 Where these doctrines applied, the local 
activity regulated by Congress was deemed to have a “direct” effect on interstate commerce.81 
The stream of commerce doctrine recognized the power of Congress to regulate local 
activities, even those falling into the category of production, where those activities were both 
preceded and followed by interstate shipment of the item in question. Thus, for example, the 
Court held in Stafford v. Wallace82 that Congress could regulate the charges imposed by owners 
of stockyards for housing, feeding, watering, and caring for livestock that had arrived from out of 
state and would continue its interstate journey after sale or slaughter. The Shreveport doctrine 
recognized congressional power to regulate rates for intrastate rail travel where necessary to 
prevent destructive competition with federally-regulated interstate carriers. Under each doctrine 
the activity in question was subject to state regulation, but Congress was free to step in and 
preempt local authority with a scheme of its own. 
In order to appreciate how narrowly circumscribed the domains of these two doctrines 
were, it is necessary to understand the important role that concepts of vested rights and 
substantive due process played in configuring the federal equilibrium. During this period, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment performed a role analogous to that played in 
the antebellum period by Article I, Section 10’s prohibition on state laws impairing the 
obligation of contract. In each case, the constitutional provision placed constraints on the policy 
options available to states and localities in the realm of political economy. Though substantive 
due process is conventionally most closely associated with decisions invalidating certain 
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regulations of the employment relationship, its broadest application came in cases involving the 
regulation of prices and rates charged by businesses and utilities.83 
 Following its 1877 decision upholding the regulation of rates charged by grain elevators 
in Munn v. Illinois,84 the Court repeatedly held that the prices of goods and services provided by 
ordinary private enterprises were not amenable to government regulation. An enterprise was 
subject to price and certain other forms of regulation only if it were a “business affected with a 
public interest.” Though there was some disagreement among the justices concerning where the 
outer boundaries of this category lay, at its core were those businesses that provided a necessary 
or indispensable good or service for which the market provided no substitute. Because the public 
was forced to deal with such “virtual monopolies,” they could extract from their customers 
“exorbitant charges.” No one had a vested right to a monopoly rent, however, so regulation of 
their prices that still allowed them a “reasonable return” on their investment did not deprive them 
of property without due process of law. The rather brief list of enterprises that fell into this 
narrow category included railroads, power and water utilities, public stockyards, public grain 
exchanges, and grain elevators,85 which, as Chief Justice Morrison Waite put it in Munn, stood 
“in the very gateway of commerce,” taking “toll from all who pass.”86 
It was just such enterprises that occupied a monopolistic position in streams of interstate 
commerce, and it was only such activities that were held to be subject to federal regulation under 
the stream of commerce doctrine. Of the four stream of commerce cases the Court decided 
during this period, three involved public stockyards87 and the other involved a major public grain 
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exchange.88 In order to be a local business subject to federal regulation under the stream of 
commerce doctrine, it was necessary that such a business be affected with a public interest. The 
stream of commerce doctrine thus cut a very narrow channel, leaving the overwhelming majority 
of local enterprises free from federal regulation. 
The Shreveport doctrine was similarly constrained by due process limitations. There, 
congressional power to regulate intrastate rates for rail carriage was derived from its power to 
regulate interstate rates. Of course, Congress had power to regulate such interstate rates – and 
therefore intrastate rates – only because railroads were businesses affected with a public interest. 
Indeed, between the time that the doctrine was announced in 1914 and 1937, all of the cases in 
which the Court applied the Shreveport case involved railroads. No other area of local economic 
activity fell within the doctrine’s purview.89 
The Court abandoned of this category of due process jurisprudence in the 1934 case of 
Nebbia v. New York,90 declaring that there was “no closed class or category of businesses 
affected with a public interest.” Henceforth, that term would mean only that “an industry, for 
adequate reason, [was] subject to control for the public good.” Due process required “only that 
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have 
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”91 The remarkable relaxation of 
this due process limitation opened vast new frontiers for regulation underwritten by the 
Commerce Clause doctrines that it had previously constrained. The stream of commerce, now 
free to overflow its former banks, could justify a flood of federal regulation. Attorneys defending 
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act deliberately selected as test cases 
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disputes at manufacturing plants that acquired most of their raw materials from other states and 
then shipped their finished products across state lines. Such formerly “private” enterprises, they 
now claimed, stood astride a stream of interstate commerce and were accordingly subject to 
federal regulation.92 Their efforts were rewarded with success in the Labor Board Cases,93 and 
such broadened stream of commerce arguments continued to play a prominent role in legal 
arguments, scholarly commentary, and judicial decisions throughout the late 1930s.94 
This revolution in due process jurisprudence likewise dramatically expanded the range of 
application of the Shreveport doctrine. Now that the due process clause no longer limited price 
regulation to a narrow class of businesses affected with a public interest, Congress was free to 
prescribe reasonable prices at which items such as coal, milk, and a variety of agricultural 
commodities could be sold in interstate commerce. And because the successful regulation of 
interstate prices required that Congress also regulate prices and marketing in intrastate 
transactions, the Court repeatedly held that the Shreveport doctrine authorized such regulation. 
Thus, by reorienting its regulatory efforts toward marketing rather than production, Congress 
could wield substantial control over national and local markets.95  
These transformations alone, however, did not extend congressional jurisdiction to most 
of the “local” activities previously regulated only by states and localities. The stream of 
commerce did not extended to local production, such as mining or agriculture, which preceded 
interstate commerce. Nor did it reach local activities conducted after the stream of interstate 
commerce had come to its terminus in a destination state. Similarly, the Shreveport doctrine did 
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not authorize federal regulation of intrastate activity unless it were necessary and proper to 
maintain the efficacy of a program that the commerce power authorized Congress to enact. 
Indeed, the Court cautioned that the liberalized Commerce Clause doctrines must be applied “in 
the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects 
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local 
and create a completely centralized government.”96 The justices continued throughout the late 
1930s to employ the same categories and vocabulary that had governed both affirmative and 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for decades.97 
That longstanding, coordinated jurisprudential enterprise came to an end with Wickard v. 
Filburn.98 There the Court upheld federal regulations limiting the acreage that a farmer could 
plant during any given season. The farmer who had planted more wheat than was authorized 
claimed that his excess wheat would be marketed neither in interstate nor in intrastate commerce, 
but would instead be consumed on his own farm. The Court nevertheless reasoned that such a 
means of satisfying one’s own demand for wheat, if pursued by many others similarly situated, 
could have a significant effect on the aggregate demand for wheat. This in turn could have a 
significant effect on the price at which wheat traded in interstate commerce. And because 
Congress had the power to regulate the price at which wheat was marketed in interstate 
commerce, it therefore had the power to regulate local activities where it was necessary and 
proper to make effective its program of interstate marketing regulation. In arriving at this 
conclusion, Justice Robert Jackson’s unanimous opinion for the Court rejected the analytic 
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categories that had bound affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence together for 
half a century. Now it was of no significance that the activity Congress purported to regulate was 
one of production; nor would questions of congressional power any longer turn on whether the 
effect of an activity on interstate commerce was “direct” or “indirect.” The only question was 
whether the aggregate effect of such activities on interstate commerce was “substantial.” 
This recognition of virtual plenary congressional power under the Commerce Clause had 
immediate and dramatic implications for dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If 
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce was both plenary and exclusive, then 
longstanding state powers to regulate and tax what previously had been regarded as “local” 
activities would be implicitly preempted, and the regulatory vacuum feared by late-nineteenth 
jurists and commentators would have become a reality. The Court avoided this consequence by 
quickly abandoning the premise of congressional exclusivity, replacing it with the premise that, 
in the absence of statutory preemption, state and federal governments enjoyed concurrent power 
to regulate matters over which the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses together 
conferred power on Congress. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was thereby reoriented 
from a focus on the scope of legislative jurisdiction to inquiries into whether state or local 
regulations discriminated against or unduly burdened interstate commerce.99 
This doctrinal decoupling of affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
however, obscured a common underlying theoretical foundation. Jackson had come to regard 
questions of congressional power under the Commerce Clause as political questions not only 
because economic integration had made judicial line-drawing impracticable, but also because he 
believed that state and local interests were adequately protected in the national political process 
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through their representation in Congress.100 By contrast, as Justice Harlan Fiske Stone observed 
in the dormant Commerce Clause case of South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell 
Brothers,101 the interests of sister states were not adequately represented in state and local 
legislative bodies, and for this reason it was appropriate for those interests to be safeguarded by 
judicial review. This “representation-reinforcement” conception of federalism, famously 
articulated by Marshall in McCulloch, thus became a central organizing principle of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. 
The line of affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine just described concerned the power of 
Congress to regulate local activities because of their relationship to interstate commerce. Another 
line of affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine concerned the power of Congress to prohibit the 
interstate shipment or transport of disfavored items. This line of doctrine similarly followed a 
course of development influenced by both dormant Commerce Clause and substantive due 
process jurisprudence. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Court began to infer from the 
grant of the commerce power to Congress a disability on the part of states to exclude from their 
borders such controversial items as liquor, oleomargarine, and cigarettes. Even though the Due 
Process Clause would permit extensive regulation of such items under state and local police 
powers once they had become intermingled with the general property of the state, so long as they 
remained in their “original packages” they fell within the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of 
Congress.102 
Congress responded to the opening of such regulatory lacunae in three ways. The first 
was with legislation “divesting” the article of its interstate character upon its arrival in the 
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destination state, even while it remained in its original package, thereby permitting state 
regulation of the article’s disposition under the police power. Congress enacted such measures 
with respect to alcoholic beverages, oleomargarine colored to resemble butter, and eventually 
convict-made goods, and the Court upheld these statutes when they were challenged. The second 
generation of such “cooperative” statutes prohibited interstate transport of an article, such as 
liquor or convict-made goods, into a state where it was to be used, sold, or possessed in violation 
of the destination state’s law. The Court likewise sustained these measures. The third legislative 
response was to prohibit interstate transportation of an article altogether, irrespective of whether 
its use, possession, or disposition would violate the law of a destination state. The Court upheld 
such statutes prohibiting interstate transport of lottery tickets and of impure or mislabeled food 
and drugs. But in Hammer v. Dagenhart,103 a narrowly divided Court struck down a statute 
prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods produced by firms employing children under 
specified ages and for certain hours.104 
The apparent inconsistency in this line of cases presents a puzzle. The majority 
maintained that the Child Labor Act was a regulation of production, but this claim suffered from 
two deficiencies pointed out by the dissent. First, the Act regulated only the interstate 
transportation of the firm’s products, not the conditions of their production. Second, to the extent 
that the prohibition on shipment indirectly affected conditions of production in the firm, it was 
not distinguishable from the Lottery Act, which by eliminating the interstate market in lottery 
tickets reduced the volume of their production, nor from the Pure Food and Drugs Act, which by 
prohibiting interstate shipment of articles not meeting the standards prescribed by the Act 
naturally affected the conditions of their production. The majority sought to distinguish those 
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statutes on the ground that they prohibited interstate shipment of goods that were “harmful,” 
whereas child-made goods were “of themselves harmless” and would, unlike lottery tickets or 
impure food, inflict no harm in the state of destination. This distinction was undermined seven 
years later when, to the howls of Hammer’s many critics, the Court unanimously upheld a 
federal prohibition on the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles without explaining how 
such articles were “of themselves” harmful.105 
Reconciliation of this line of cases requires a recognition that their differing results are 
explicable in terms of vested rights and substantive due process. The structure of the doctrine 
rested on the proposition that once a property right in an item had vested under the applicable 
state law, the Due Process Clauses prohibited either Congress or sister state legislatures from 
disadvantageously regulating the disposition of that item unless such a disposition threatened the 
infliction of a cognizable harm within the legislative jurisdiction of the regulating sovereign. In 
the absence of a threat that such a cognizable harm might be inflicted within Congress’s 
legislative jurisdiction, therefore, a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of an item 
deprived its owner of property without due process of law. Were the threat of such a harm 
present, however, a prohibition on interstate shipment would not deprive the owner of property 
without due process, for no one could have a vested right to inflict harm on public health, safety, 
or morals.106 
Thus, Congress was competent to prohibit interstate transportation of intoxicating liquors 
due to the threat that they posed to public health, safety, and morals in states of destination. Just 
as the states could prohibit their manufacture and sale without violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, so Congress could exclude them from interstate commerce 
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without violating the corresponding provision of the Fifth Amendment. As it was equally well 
established that states were empowered to outlaw the sale of lottery tickets due to their 
tendencies to corrupt morals and contribute to penury, so it followed that Congress impaired no 
vested right by excluding lottery tickets from interstate channels. And because no one enjoyed a 
vested right to harm public health and safety through the distribution of impure foods or 
medicines, nor to defraud the public by deceptively labeling such goods, congressional 
prohibition of interstate shipment of such products deprived no one of property without due 
process. Because in each of these instances the original package doctrine made possible the 
infliction of the threatened harm while the article in question remained within the federal 
legislative jurisdiction, Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to guard against such 
an eventuality.107 
For similar reasons, federal statutes prohibiting interstate transportation of wild game or 
petroleum acquired in violation of the law of the state of origin weathered judicial review. 
Because neither the poacher nor the wildcat driller obtained a vested right in the article illegally 
taken, laws forbidding such interstate transport did not deprive their possessors of property 
without due process. Nor was a prohibition on the interstate transport of stolen cars 
constitutionally problematic. For though a stolen car might in itself be no more dangerous than a 
shoe made by a child, neither the thief nor anyone knowingly taking from him had any vested 
right in the pilfered motor vehicle. In each of these cases, the legislation was valid not because it 
prevented infliction of a harm within the federal legislative jurisdiction, but instead because it 
impaired no vested right.108 
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The Child Labor Act was the one such federal initiative that fell within neither of these 
safe harbors. To be sure, it was established that there was no constitutional right to employ 
children, and any state was free to prohibit such employment. But if, for example, the state of 
North Carolina chose to permit the employment of children in its factories, then the employer of 
that labor acquired a vested right in its product under the law of that state. The power of 
Congress to exclude that product from interstate commerce thus turned on whether the good 
threatened to inflict a cognizable harm outside the legislative jurisdiction of the state of its 
production.109  
This made a great deal turn on which types of extraterritorial harms the Court regarded as 
legally privileged, and which it recognized as falling outside the protection of the Due Process 
Clause. In Hammer, the government contended that the extraterritorial harm inflicted was 
competitive in nature. A firm employing children could pay them less than adults, which reduced 
its overhead as compared with that of competing firms in states with more restrictive child labor 
laws. This “unfair competition” would cause economic harm to firms in more child-protective 
states, which would induce them to pressure their legislatures to relax their own child labor 
standards and thereby jeopardize the health and safety of that state’s children. But the Hammer 
majority refused to recognize the threat of such competitive harms as a justification for federal 
intervention, pronounced child-made goods of themselves harmless, and invalidated the statute. 
It was this narrow conception of what constituted a cognizable harm under the Due Process 
Clause that restrained congressional power to prohibit interstate shipment.110 
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315612 
 43 
 
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,111 however, the Court upheld a federal 
prohibition on interstate transport of filled milk. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stone 
expressly disaggregated from the Commerce Clause analysis the due process analysis with which 
it had been conflated by the Hammer majority. Prohibitions on interstate shipment were 
exercises of the commerce power, Stone declared, constrained only by other provisions of the 
Constitution such as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Moreover, Stone announced 
that henceforth in cases involving challenges to economic regulation under the Due Process 
Clauses, the Court would accord a broad measure of deference to legislative judgments 
concerning harm. This relaxation of the due process constraint on the commerce power paved the 
way for the recognition in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.112 that the sort of unfair 
competition generated by firms employing child laborers or underpaid workers was a harm that 
Congress was empowered to remedy through prohibitions on the interstate shipment of goods 
produced by such firms.  Darby thus overruled Hammer, rendering congressional power to 
prohibit interstate shipments as unimpeded by judicial review as Wickard would make the power 
to regulate local activities affecting interstate commerce the following year. The 
interjurisdictional regulatory competition and policy heterogeneity among the states that had 
been underwritten by the restrictions that the Court’s protection of vested rights had placed on 
federal regulatory authority thus gave way to national policies implemented through exercises of   
a commerce power no longer constrained by due process limitations.113 
Thus, during this period the economic rights protected by the Due Process Clause 
functioned as structural mechanisms, not only marking the boundaries between individual liberty 
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and sovereign authority, but also allocating regulatory power among the state and federal 
governments.114 This was true not only with respect to the commerce power, but also with 
respect to exercises of the congressional fiscal powers. In the late nineteenth century, Congress 
began to take an interest in regulating substances and activities that lay beyond the reach of its 
commerce power by imposing prohibitive excise taxes on them. Critics of such measures 
claimed that they did not impose true taxes, but instead regulated matters reserved to the states. 
When this claim was presented to the Court in McCray v. United States,115 however, the justices 
maintained that the question was not justiciable. In upholding a ten cent per pound excise on 
oleomargarine colored to resemble butter, Chief Justice Edward White insisted that the only the 
political branches were competent to determine whether a purported tax constituted a true 
exercise of the taxing power or was instead “the exercise of an authority not conferred” by the 
Constitution. Under only one condition would the Court intervene: “where it was plain to the 
judicial mind that the power had been called into play not for revenue but solely for the purpose 
of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently with the principles of 
freedom and justice upon which the Constitution rests.” Only if an interest of the sort protected 
by the Due Process Clause were implicated would the justices address the question of whether 
Congress had encroached on the domain of the states by seeking the accomplishment of 
objectives not entrusted to the government. That principle was inapplicable in McCray, White 
observed, because the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment due process decisions had established that 
“the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine may be prohibited by a free government 
without a violation of fundamental rights.”116 
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The doctrinal structure that emerged from McCray thus entwined Fifth Amendment, 
Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers concerns in a unique configuration. As a general 
rule, principles of separation of powers would preclude the Court from inquiring into whether a 
regulatory tax was intended to invade the regulatory space reserved to the states by the Tenth 
Amendment, and thus was merely the pretextual exercise of an enumerated power. Only where a 
fundamental individual right was imperiled would the Court vindicate the Tenth Amendment 
interest in confining Congress to exercising only those powers conferred by the Constitution. So 
long as federal regulatory taxation did not transgress the limitations that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposed upon the states’ police powers, there would be no occasion for the Court to 
subject such pretextual enactments to searching judicial scrutiny. And by remaining within this 
safe harbor, over the next several decades Congress managed to secure judicial validation of 
excises not only on oleomargarine, but also on narcotics, certain firearms, marijuana, gambling, 
and ticket scalping. Thus, it was the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Tenth, that imposed the 
constitutional restraint on congressional power to regulate through taxation. Only by asserting a 
Fifth Amendment interest could one secure judicial vindication of the Tenth Amendment 
limitation.117 
It would not be long, however, before two unusually aggressive exercises of the taxing 
power prompted the Court to qualify this position. In 1922 the justices invalidated a heavy tax on 
the net profits of firms employing child labor and a prohibitive excise on options contracts in 
grain futures. No one could seriously contend that regulation of such activities transgressed the 
limitations of the Due Process Clause, as the Court had sustained earlier state prohibitions of the 
taxed conduct. But the Court found that, unlike the other taxes that it had upheld and would later 
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uphold, these taxes imposed heavy exactions for deviations from a prescribed, detailed, and 
specified course of conduct. Were the Court to sustain such a measure, then Congress could 
regulate any and all matters simply by prescribing rules of conduct and imposing excises on 
violators. The result would be a federal government of plenary rather than enumerated powers. 
The justices therefore declared the exactions “penalties” rather than true taxes, and thus beyond 
the power of Congress to impose.118 
With the taxing power now foreclosed as a means of realizing comprehensive programs 
of federal regulation, Congress turned to the spending power. The scope of this power had been 
the subject of debate from the earliest years of the Republic. James Madison had construed the 
power narrowly, maintaining that Congress could appropriate funds only as an incident to the 
exercise of its other enumerated powers. Alexander Hamilton, by contrast, insisted that the 
power to spend was a great and independent power limited only by the requirement that it be 
exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States. Throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries Congress regularly appropriated funds for a range of purposes, 
including relief of those suffering from various disasters, and several antebellum presidents 
vetoed bills underwriting internal improvement projects believed to lie beyond the power of the 
federal legislature. Yet no case directly presenting the question of the spending power’s scope 
reached the Court until nearly 150 years after the ratification of the Constitution. In United States 
v. Butler,119 however, the Court relied upon its review of “the writings of public men and 
commentators” and “the legislative practice” in resolving the dispute in favor of Hamilton. It was 
on the basis of this resolution that the Court upheld the old-age pension and unemployment 
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compensation provisions of the Social Security Act in Helvering v. Davis120 and Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis.121 
The lengthy delay preceding Butler’s pronouncement on the scope of the spending power 
was attributable in no small part to a feature of the Court’s justiciability doctrine. In 1921, 
Congress enacted the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act, which established a grant-in-aid program 
for the reduction of maternal and infant mortality. Under the statute, Congress appropriated 
funds to be disbursed to states that established qualifying programs for the promotion of infant 
and maternal health. A taxpayer in Massachusetts asserted that Congress was without authority 
to spend for such a purpose, and that the taxation necessary to fund the program would deprive 
her of her property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In 
Frothingham v. Mellon,122 the justices unanimously rejected her challenge, maintaining that she 
had no standing to bring it. The Court ruled that Frothingham’s interest in the moneys of the 
federal treasury, which was shared with millions of others, was simply too “minute and 
indeterminable” to support a justiciable claim of injury entitling her to appeal to “the preventive 
powers of a court of equity” “to enjoin the execution of a federal appropriation act.”123 
This “taxpayer standing doctrine” had profound implications for federal spending policy 
during the New Deal. So long as Congress appropriated funds for federal spending programs 
from general revenue rather than from the proceeds of a specially-dedicated tax, no one would 
have standing to challenge any such expenditures. Numerous public works, relief, and recovery 
spending programs designed with this counsel in mind managed for that very reason to elude 
judicial review. Under such a regime of justiciability, it mattered little whether the Court 
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espoused a Madisonian or a Hamiltonian reading of the General Welfare Clause. The system was 
functionally Hamiltonian.124 
United States v. Butler came to the Court precisely because the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 was not designed to fit within the taxpayer standing doctrine’s safe harbor. In an 
effort to bolster depressed prices brought on by chronic agricultural surpluses, the Act authorized 
the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into contracts with farmers, paying them to reduce their 
production of specified commodities. These benefit payments were funded by a special, 
designated tax on the processors of these commodities. The receiver of an insolvent textile mill 
thus had standing to challenge the earmarked exaction, and argued that taxing the processor in 
order to provide a benefit payment to a farmer took the processor’s property for a private rather 
than a public purpose and thereby denied it rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
agreed that an “expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another” (as 
distinguished from an “exaction for the support of the Government”) was “not a true tax,” and 
struck down the exaction as a step in a scheme to usurp the states’ regulatory authority over 
agricultural production. Here again, the Tenth Amendment interest could be vindicated only 
because a Fifth Amendment interest was also implicated.125  
Congress responded by eliminating the Fifth Amendment interest. Under the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which was enacted within two months of the 
decision in Butler, farmers were paid to shift their acreage from soil-depleting, surplus crops to 
soil-building crops such as grasses and legumes. The payments under the Act were made from 
general revenue rather than from the proceeds of an earmarked tax, with the result that no 
taxpayer had any Fifth Amendment interest that would give him standing to challenge the 
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program. With the Fifth Amendment no longer implicated, restraints on the spending power 
would be supplied, if at all, only by the political branches.126 
Before leaving this period, a few other developments should be noted briefly. First, the 
eight years between 1913 and 1920 witnessed the ratification of the first four amendments to the 
Constitution since Reconstruction. The Sixteenth Amendment (1913) empowered Congress to 
enact a federal income tax – a power that a narrowly divided Supreme Court had determined that 
Congress did not possess in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.127 It would not be long before 
the resulting increase in federal revenue would underwrite vast new federal programs both of 
direct subsidy and of regulation through conditional expenditure. What was long regarded as one 
of the structural safeguards of federalism fell when the Seventeenth Amendment (1913) 
prescribed that United States Senators would henceforth be selected not by state legislatures, but 
instead by popular, state-wide election. The Nineteenth Amendment (1920) prohibited the 
federal and state governments from denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of sex. 
And the Eighteenth Amendment (1919) launched the federal government on a decade-long 
experiment in federal enforcement throughout the country of prohibitions on the manufacture, 
sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors. Those efforts received mixed reviews at best, and 
regulation of such matters was returned to the states with the ratification of the Twenty-First 
Amendment in 1933. 
In the domain of case law, the Court held in Missouri v. Holland128 that federal 
legislation implementing treaties with foreign nations need not fall within the scope of 
Congress’s other enumerated powers. Though this decision held the potential to transform the 
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federal equilibrium at the time, Congress did not rely upon this principle in order to achieve its 
desired ends, and the dramatic expansion of the commerce power by 1942 rendered doing so 
unnecessary. Hans v. Louisiana129 held that principles of sovereign immunity protected states 
from suits in federal court brought by their own citizens, thus supplying states with an immunity 
analogous to that which they had long enjoyed under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court soon 
made it clear in Ex Parte Young,130 however, that these principles did not preclude suits against 
state officers who had acted unconstitutionally. 
The Constitutional Revolution of the New Deal Era also witnessed a “Copernican 
Revolution” concerning the rules of decision applied by federal courts sitting in diversity. In Erie 
Railroad. v. Tompkins,131 the Court overruled Swift v. Tyson and the line of cases it represented. 
Declaring that there was no federal general common law, the Court announced that henceforth in 
diversity cases federal judges would be obliged to apply the relevant state decisional law. 
Finally, in a series of cases decided in the late 1930s, the justices substantially curtailed 
longstanding principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
The dramatic expansion of federal power during this period by no means heralded the 
total displacement of state authority. Indeed, the demise of economic substantive due process 
during the 1930s “unshackled” state governments, thereby permitting them to engage in forms of 
regulation that previous decisions had forbidden.132 State and local government would continue 
to exert primary control over the content of such expansive realms of positive law as contracts 
and commercial transactions, property and land use, torts and insurance, marriage and divorce, 
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wills, trusts, and inheritance, corporate law and criminal law. In the wake of the New Deal 
constitutional settlement, however, the contours of the federal equilibrium with respect to such 
matters were largely left to the discretion of federal legislators. 
 
Constitutional Federalism Since the New Deal 
In May of 1939, Harold Laski published an article in The New Republic entitled “The 
Obsolescence of Federalism.” Laski opined that “the federal form of state is unsuitable to the 
stage of economic and social development that America has reached,” and declared that “the 
epoch of federalism is over.”133 Rather than a blessing to be celebrated, federalism was a 
problem to be solved. Later scholars would go so far as to declare federalism “a national 
neurosis.”134 In the decades following the New Deal Constitutional Revolution, it became the 
reigning orthodoxy that the political process alone was sufficient to impose whatever limits on 
federal power might remain desirable, and that judicial review no longer had a meaningful role to 
play.135 Congress enacted and the Court approved uses of the commerce power to regulate not 
only ever-widening swaths of the economy, but a variety of other matters ranging from civil 
rights to street crime as well. Through the extensive use of conditional grants of federal funds 
and conditional preemption of fields of regulation, Congress induced state legislatures to enact 
programs to facilitate the achievement of a broad array of federal goals concerning areas as 
diverse as health care, education and training, job counseling, child care, housing, conservation, 
                                                          
133 Harold J. Laski, “The Obsolescence of Federalism,” 98 The New Republic 367 (1939). 
134 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, “Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,” 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903 
(1994). 
135 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review 
and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980); Herbert 
Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the 
National Government,” 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315612 
 52 
 
transportation, and urban redevelopment.136 All of this was achieved without meaningful judicial 
resistance. By mid-century Professor Edward S. Corwin would proclaim “The Passing of Dual 
Federalism,” and joined others in hailing the rise of a new “cooperative federalism.”137 Social 
scientists valorizing the displacement of dual federalism by “intergovernmental relations” 
declared that the federal and state governments were now so intermingled and interdependent in 
matters of public administration that the federal system was no longer a “layer cake,” but instead 
a “marble cake.”138 By 1968, Professor Phillip Kurland would announce that “federalism as a 
viable constitutional principle” was “moribund if it is not dead.”139 
One can readily understand why observers such as Kurland had come to such a 
conclusion. The decades following the Great Depression were characterized not only by 
significant expansion of the federal regulatory apparatus, but also by the judicial imposition of 
new constitutional constraints in areas of governance traditionally left to state and local 
authorities. These inhibitions emerged from two related jurisprudential developments: the 
Court’s application to the states of limitations contained in the Bill of Rights, and an ever-
broadening construction of the restraints imposed by the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After discussing these developments, this section will 
turn to the federalism “revival” of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This period witnessed the 
resuscitation of modest limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause and Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the emergence of a more robust doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity. At the same time, however, broad readings of the taxing power, the 
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Necessary and Proper Clause and, most importantly, the spending power, continued to supply 
Congress with virtually plenary regulatory authority that was constrained only by the Bill of 
Rights and the political process. 
In Barron v. Baltimore,140 the Marshall Court had established that the Bill of Rights 
imposed limitations only on Congress, and did not apply to the states. This view was 
controversial in some contemporary quarters, and after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court was confronted with claims that among the privileges or immunities 
protected against state abridgment by the Amendment were the rights enumerated in most if not 
all of the Constitution’s first eight amendments. Though recent scholarship has unearthed 
significant evidence in support of such a claim,141 for many years it was the conventional 
wisdom that the contention was mistaken.142 This was the view taken by a Court majority 
anxious to limit the scope of Section One’s guarantees lest Section Five’s enforcement power be 
understood to authorize congressional regulation of virtually every aspect of local conduct. In 
1873 the justices gave the Privileges or Immunities Clause a remarkably narrow reading in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases,143 and held in a series of subsequent decisions that various provisions of 
the Bill of Rights did not protect citizens from their own state governments.144 
Over the next several decades the Court would moderate this position, holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied against the states only those provisions of the Bill of Rights 
embodying a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
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be ranked as fundamental.”145 By 1940 the justices had determined that rights of free speech,146 
freedom of the press,147 peaceable assembly,148 and free exercise of religion149 met that standard, 
whereas the right to indictment by grand jury,150 the right to trial by jury in civil and criminal 
cases,151 the privilege against self-incrimination,152 and the prohibition on double jeopardy did 
not.153  
During the 1940s this “selective incorporation” approach came under attack from Justice 
Hugo Black, who argued that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed on the states all of the 
restraints of the Bill of Rights.154 Though the Court never embraced Black’s theory of “total 
incorporation,” the process of selective incorporation proceeded at such a dizzying pace under 
the Chief Justiceship of Earl Warren that it would not be long before Black’s vision would be 
very nearly realized. At the same time, expansive new readings of the incorporated First 
Amendment placed new limits on the role that religion could play in public schools,155 the power 
of state and local officials to curb speech to which they objected,156 and the authority of courts to 
sanction defamatory publications.157 Similarly momentous were novel and sometimes elaborate 
constructions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, which curtailed the power and 
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discretion of state and local officials with a judicially-crafted, uniform, national code of criminal 
procedure.158 
A revolution in the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause similarly 
curtailed longstanding state and local powers to formulate and implement social policy. In case 
after case, the Court announced that racial segregation in public universities, public primary and 
secondary schools, public transportation, and such public facilities as parks, swimming pools, 
and golf courses was inconsistent with the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education159 did not produce significant racial 
integration in southern public schools, however. Instead, orders to desegregate were met with 
“massive resistance” in the South, and tangible integration began to materialize in the mid-1960s 
only as a result of conditioning eligibility for federal educational grants-in-aid on local 
compliance with federally-established desegregation standards. Soon lingering prohibitions on 
interracial marriage were invalidated in the aptly titled case of Loving v. Virginia.160  In addition, 
Baker v. Carr161 and Reynolds v. Sims162 saw the Court entering the “political thicket” and 
requiring that state legislative districts be apportioned so as to conform to the standard of “one 
person, one vote.”  
Soon this luxuriation of Equal Protection jurisprudence spread to new domains, as the 
Court invalidated a variety of state and local measures disadvantaging women, aliens, nonmarital 
children, hippies, those with mental disabilities and, eventually, sexual minorities. In tandem 
with the near-total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, this expanded domain of equal protection 
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produced a wave of structural reform litigation that placed a large number of state or local 
schools, prisons, jails, mental health facilities, housing authorities, and public employers under 
the ongoing supervision and control of federal courts. Innovative and often controversial 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause similarly expanded the 
domain of federal rights at the expense of local regulatory power. Decisions from the 1920s had 
recognized the rights of parents to direct the educations of their children,163 but in the decades 
following 1965 the justices further extended rights to be free from traditional state and local 
regulations in such matters as the distribution of contraceptives, the provision of abortion, sexual 
conduct, and marriage.164  
 By the mid-1970s, the judicial “consensus” surrounding the claim that the national 
political process was adequate to safeguard the values of federalism had begun to unravel. In 
National League of Cities v. Usery,165 a Court transformed by four Nixon appointments held that 
the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to prescribe minimum wages and maximum 
hours for state and local government employees engaged in “traditional governmental functions” 
such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. A 
change of mind on the part of one justice resulted in the overruling of that decision nine years 
later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,166 and it seemed that the political 
process approach had been restored to its former primacy. But soon the Court began to qualify its 
position by holding that federal statutes did not reach traditional governmental functions of states 
and localities unless they contained a “clear statement” of intent to do so.167 At the same time, 
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the justices became less inclined to find that Congress had preempted state or local regulation by 
“occupying the field,” instead requiring a showing that the challenged state or local law was 
expressly preempted by the language of the federal statute or “conflicted” with provisions of the 
federal program. And though the Supremacy Clause required state judges to apply and enforce 
relevant federal law, the Court held in New York v. United States168 and Printz v. United States169 
respectively that Congress could not command state legislatures to enact nor state and local 
executive officials to enforce federal regulatory programs. 
Meanwhile, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida170 the Court overruled the recent 
decision of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.171 and held that Congress could not exercise the 
commerce power so as to abrogate state sovereign immunity in suits brought in federal court. 
Three years later Alden v. Maine172 extended this principle both to all of Congress’s Article I 
powers and to suits brought in state courts. Suits against state officers remained available, 
however, and Congress continued to be free to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it was 
exercising its powers to enforce the guaranties of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Yet 
in a series of decisions beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores,173 the justices began to construe 
those powers more narrowly than had such earlier decisions as Katzenbach v. Morgan.174 In 
holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 could not be enforced against state 
and local governments, the Court declared that Congress did not possess “the power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the states.” That was a matter for 
judicial determination, and congressional exercises of the enforcement powers were required to 
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bear a “congruence and proportionality” between the constitutional “injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”175 The interaction of reduced congressional 
latitude to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment with the Court’s sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence produced a patchwork of cases holding that states were not amenable to suit under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,176 that they were so amenable under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act,177 and that they could be sued under some provisions of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act178 but not under others.179 
The high water mark in the revival of judicially imposed limits on congressional power 
came in United States v. Lopez180 and United States v. Morrison.181 Lopez struck down a federal 
statute that proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school, on the ground that 
the activity regulated was not “economic,” but instead pertained to crime and education, two 
traditional areas of state and local concern. Morrison followed Lopez in striking down a 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that created a federal civil remedy for 
gender-based violence. In each case the Court held that the effect of the regulated activity on 
interstate commerce was too attenuated to be “substantial,” and that because the activities in 
question were not economic in nature, Wickard’s principle of aggregation did not apply. The 
Morrison Court further relied upon the state action doctrine in holding that the provision lay 
beyond Congress’s power to enforce the guaranties of the Equal Protection Clause. 
It soon became clear, however, how limited the effects of the Court’s new federalism 
jurisprudence would be. In the immediate wake of Lopez, Congress enacted a revised statute 
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prohibiting possession within 1000 feet of a school of any firearm “that has moved in or that 
otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Armed with this new jurisdictional hook, the 
statute was uniformly upheld in the lower federal courts. The decision in Morrison, though 
certainly more consequential, left standing the legions of other provisions comprising the Act’s 
massive federal initiative to protect women across the country from violent abuse. In Gonzales v. 
Raich,182 the Court upheld congressional prohibition of the production and use of home-grown 
marijuana for medicinal purposes even where such conduct had been authorized by the state 
legislature. And in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,183 the justices 
held that though the commerce power could not underwrite a federal exaction imposed on 
persons who failed to acquire health insurance, the taxing power was adequate to the task. 
Behind all of these developments lurked the capacious power of Congress to subsidize 
and regulate local activity through its spending power, even where such regulation lay beyond 
the reach of its other enumerated powers. Just as the federal government had desegregated 
southern public schools through the use of the power of the purse, so it continued to induce the 
states to enact other desired regulations by conditioning receipt of federal funds on compliance 
with federal directives. The scope of the conditional spending power was resoundingly affirmed 
in South Dakota v. Dole,184 where the Court upheld a regulation conditioning state eligibility for 
certain federal highway funds on the states raising their drinking ages to twenty-one. And even 
where Congress transgressed limitations on the use of the conditional spending power, it 
remained free to provide direct subsidies. Thus, even though Sebelius struck down as 
unconstitutionally coercive the Affordable Care Act’s provision requiring the states to expand 
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eligibility for Medicaid or forfeit all of their federal Medicaid funding, federal authorities 
nevertheless provided funding necessary to subsidize the expansion in the many states that 
elected to do so, and no constitutional obstacle prevented a direct federal appropriation 
subsidizing health insurance for persons living in states that elected against expansion. 
Meanwhile, many other vast programs of congressional regulation through conditional spending 
continued, unimpeded by judicial let or hindrance, even as the justices repeatedly approved uses 
of the necessary and proper power in conjunction with both the spending power and other 
enumerated powers.  In nearly all cases, it seemed, one or more of Congress’s enumerated 
powers would suffice to achieve the desired objective. Notwithstanding some comparatively 
modest judicial tinkering at the margins, it remained the case that effective restraints on the 
exercise of congressional power “must,” as Justice Jackson wrote in Wickard, “proceed from 
political rather than from judicial processes.”185 
 
                                                          
185 317 U.S. at 120. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315612 
